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A Systemic Approach to a Railway Accident Scenario Analysis Using a Quality Function Deployment

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Background



• Risk assessment of Railway system



Background



Accident Analysis Method										
O FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis)										
O FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)										
O MORT (Management Oversight and Risk Tree)										
O Fault Hazard Analysis										
O STEP (Sequentially Time Event Plotting)										
O SCAT (Systemic Casual Analysis Technique)										
"At the early stage of risk assessment, These method can be subjective depending on analysts' per <u>sonal experience</u>										
and be difficult to make a systematic analysis in a general view"										
Accident Scenario Analysis Method										
" Process of understanding, analyzing, and describing accidents and the behavior patterns of										
hazardous conditions" - Cushman and Rosenberg, Human Factors in product design, 1991-										
" Devise a limited number of accident scenarios with descriptions of victims, products,										
environment, and task" - Drury and Brill, Human Factors, 1983-										

Research Objectives



"Although much work has been done to apply scenario analysis to railway accidents, there is still no systematic and formal methodology which identifies generates, analyzes, and verifies accident scenarios, in our view. "

The absence of such a methodology raises questions regarding accuracy and objectivity

Research Objectives



- Inspired by the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) method
 - conventionally used in quality management
 - used at the systematic accident scenario analysis (SASA) for the design of safer products

 The QFD provides a formal and systematic schema to devise accident scenarios while maintaining the objectivity.



Risk Assessment Process



"Risk assessment is tightly coupled with hazard identification and risk reduction"

- The PHA, often called hazard identification, is used in the early life cycle state
 - Identifying critical system functions and system hazard factors.
 - Understanding how hazard factors contribute to railway accidents
 - Understanding, analyzing, and describing the accident process
 - This can be accomplished by applying the accident analysis method



Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)





Quality Function Deployment (QFD)



In QFD, the relationship between customer needs and the quality requirements necessary to produce those needs are charted as House of Quality (HOQ).



Railway Accident Scenario Analysis Approach



Identifying hazardous events & Determining Hazardous Conditions



Step 1: Hazardous events Identification	 This step is probably the most important in that it can pinpoint the safety problems Carried out mainly by gathering various accident-related reports and information to define hazardous events such as collisions, derailments, explosions, etc. A series of hazard evaluation approaches as FMEA, FTA can be also used.
Step 2: Hazardous Conditions Determination	 O characteristics and circumstances surrounding a railway accident. O In case of a product use accident, Drury and Brill makes hazardous conditions composed of a product, a user, a task and an environment. O For railway accidents, this study makes hazardous conditions composed of the four parts: (1) victim, (2) task, (2) environment, and (4) cause.

		Hazardous Conditions													
		Victim Characteristics			Task Characteristics			Environment Characteristics			Cause Characteristics				
Hazardous Events	Impor tance	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••		
Hazardous Event 1				Relationship Rating Indication ()											
Hazardous Event 2															
			△: Moderate relationship (3)												
Hazardous Event N					O: Slight or possible relationship (1)										



Evaluating Relationships

		Hazardous Conditions											
		Cha	Victim aracteris	tics	Cha	Task aracteris	tics	Er Cha	vironme aracteris	ent tics	Cha	Cause aracteris	tics
Hazardous Events	Impor tance	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••
Hazardous Event 1							ohin D	oting In	diastia				
Hazardous Event 2	2				<u> </u>	<u>kelation</u>	<u>snip Ra</u>	ating in	aicatio	<u>n</u>		Ĺ	
•						©: St	rong re	lations	hip (5))	
· ·					\cap	\triangle : Moc Slight o	lerate r r possi	elation:	ship (3) tionshi) in (1)			
Hazardous Event N	1						1 00331						
Step 3: Evaluating Relationships	0	The QF the dire The pro - rates the se - evalu - the ra with t	D meth ect expo oposed the im everity ates re atings a the larg	od is ra erience I metho portanc of the h lations are gene	ated bas of the d e of a h hazardo hip by o erally w ber ind	sed on a QFD de nazardo ous even comput reighteo icating	the rest velopm ous eve nt (e.g. ing the l with 1 greater	ults of o nent tea nt by co equiva freque to 5 or r impor	questio im omputii lent fata ncy. 1 to 9 tance c	ng ality pe scales or stron	s and r year) ger rela	ationshi	ip.

Devising the accident scenarios & Testing the feasibility of the relationships

Hazardous Event N



Step 4: Devising the accident scenarios		The scl scenar For exa four vi three e devise	he scheme, 'railway accident analysis tableau', creates cenarios from a matrix of all the possible relationships or example, if any hazardous event is related to our victim characteristics, two task characteristics, hree environment characteristics, and one cause characteristic, levise a total of 4×2×3×1 = 24 accident scenarios.											
Step 5: Testing the feasibility of the relationships	0	D filter out infeasible relationships between elements of the hazardous conditions - mitigating the need to devise and analyse the accident scenarios												
						На	zardous	Conditio	ons					
		Cha	VictimTaskEnvironmentCharacteristicsCharacteristicsCharacteristics						Cha	Cause Characteristics				
Hazardous Events	Impor tance	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	
Hazardous Event 1														
Hazardous Event 2					Relationship Rating Indication									
•						©: St	rong re	lations	hip (5)					
•					0:	⊥: wo Slight c	perate r possi	ble rela	snip (3) ationshi	ip (1)		ſ		

Calculating the total weighting & Clustering and Patterning the accident scenarios



		Hazardous Conditions											
		Victim Characteristics			Task Characteristics			Environment Characteristics			Cha	itics	
Hazardous Events	Impor tance	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••
Hazardous Event 1							ohin D						
Hazardous Event 2					<u> </u>	<u>kelation</u>	isnip Ka	ating in	idicatio	<u>n</u>			
•						©: St	rong re	lations	hip (5)				
					\frown	\triangle : Moo	lerate r	elation	ship (3) stionsh) in (1)			
Hazardous Event N							1 00331						
Step 6: Calculating the total weighting	0	 O To calculate the total weight for each railway accident scenario, The importance of the hazardous event is multiplied by each of its corresponding hazardous conditions, then added together to get the total. O The highest ranked railway scenario describes the most hazardous case. 											
Step 7: Clustering and Patterning the accident scenarios	0.	 O The highest ranked railway scenario describes the most hazardous case. O The process may create too many railway accident scenarios to be dealt with. O In order to understand the hazardous condition thoroughly, the clustering and pattering processes are introduced. O These processes make the proposed method an easier and simpler railway accident analysis method. 											

Conclusions



"devise an accident scenario analysis method for creating accident scenarios at the PHA step of a hazard analysis for railway system"

- This approach was inspired by the QFD method.
- In this study, the QFD method provides a formal and systematic schema to devise accident scenarios while maintaining the objectivity.
- The accident scenario analysis method first identifies the hazardous events and explains the hazardous conditions

"Since this method enables an accident scenario analysis to be performed systematically as well as objectively, this method is useful in building better accident prevention strategies"



O This method is useful in building better accident prevention strategies.

O This study could serve to reduce railway accidents and could be an effective tool for a hazard analysis.



Thanks for the attention!

