



Introduction of PSA Applications in the Nuclear and Petrochemical Industries

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
June 6, 2009



Outline

- I、 Introduction
- II、 Development of the RIA Tools, Risk Engine and Risk Monitor
- III、 Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE
- IV、 Development of Risk-Informed Fire Analysis, ISI, and OLM
- V、 QRA Application on LNG
- VI、 Conclusions

工欲善其事
必先利其器





I、Taiwan in the History of PRA Technology

Date	Events and Effects
1970	1975 USAEC issued WASH-1400 1979 Three Mile Island Accident
1980	1982 ROCAEC initiated the first PRA program for domestic NPPs in Taiwan 1985 1st Kuosheng PRA was accomplished 1987 1st Maanshan PRA was accomplished
1990	1988 USNRC issued GL88-20, IPE (Individual Plant Examination) was requested for all US NPPs 1990 USNRC issued NUREG-1150 (PRA studies for 5 selected NPPs) 1991 1st Chinshan PRA was accomplished 1993 US utilities issued IPEs for NRC review 1995 USNRC issued “The PRA Policy Statement” and agency-wide PRA implementation plan 1995 Power operation living PRA project was accomplished in Taiwan for 3 operating NPPs 1996 Shutdown PRA framework was accomplished in Taiwan for 3 operating NPPs 1997 ~ Now : Taipower Integrated Risk Monitor is established in Taiwan for 3 operating NPPs
2000	1998 NRC released risk-informed applications associated Regulatory Guide 1.174~1.178 2000 ~ Now : PRA models are ready for risk-informed applications





I、PRA Development in Taiwan

Establishment

Refinement

Application



1982-1992

- Static PRA (completed Level 2 PRA)
- NPP modification & improvement


1993-1996

- Living PRA
- Up-to-date models
- Shutdown & power models


1997-Now

- TIRM-2
- RIFA-2 & RIFADISP
- INER fault tree engine, INERFT
- OLM (PWR & BWR RHR)
- RI-ISI
- LNG QRA


I · Risk Contributions for Different Types of NPPs




BWR-4, CDF=2.1E-5/ry



BWR-6, CDF=5.3E-5/ry



PWR, CDF=6.0E-5/ry



ABWR, CDF=3.5E-6/ry

I · Introduction (1 of 3)

- The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) group of INER has developed and maintains the PRA models of all the nuclear power plants (NPPs) for Taiwan Power Company (TPC) over 25 years since PRA was first introduced to Taiwan's NPPs
- These PRA models cover internal and external events, power operation and shutdown mode, with LERF (Large Early Release Frequency) calculation modules
- The PRA group has completed a dedicated risk monitor with indigenous model solver engines, which are now adopted by the domestic three NPPs to monitor daily operation risks



I · Introduction (2 of 3)

- A window-based tool with the Significance Determination Process (SDP) context to help the resident inspectors of Taiwan's nuclear regulatory body to perform the Phase 2 SDP assessment of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) has also been completed
- Staff of INER was invited to present a 30-minute talk on the PRiSE at the 523th ACRS meeting chaired by Dr. G. B. Wallis on June 2, 2005

I、Introduction (3 of 3)

- Since 2003, the Minister of Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council, Dr. Min-Shen Ouyang has been reiterating that AEC's overall goals in regulating Taipower's operating LWRs are threefold: "Safety First, Deregulation, and Administrative Simplification."
(安全第一、法規鬆綁、簡政便民)
- The second and third points are new policy, and are an indication that things are moving to a pro risk-informed direction. Taiwan's regulatory body is working with Taipower management to "gradually introduce" risk-informed practices into Taiwan



II 、 Development of the RIA Tool, Risk Engine

- The development of Taiwan's risk engine has paved a successful path for providing the helpful tools for Risk-Informed Regulations/Applications
- The module includes a super risk engine, the INERISKEN (INER RISK ENgine) to solve PRA model within one minute through the advanced PRA model in the form of top-logic fault tree
- The results showed that INERISKEN has an excellent performance and can be used in the associated applications
- In addition to the nuclear industry, INERFT (INER Fault Tree) is applied to other petrochemical industries in Taiwan



II、Development of the RIA Tool, Risk Monitor (1 of 7)


- On the basis of the accomplished living PRA models on all of the three Taiwan's NPPs, INER and TPC have collaboratively developed a risk monitor, the Taipower Integrated Risk Monitor (TIRM), for each NPP
- Due to the TIRM's robust function and its successful development, since June of 2001, Taiwan's nuclear regulatory body has requested that each NPP evaluate shutdown risk before TPC performs refuelling outages and calculate the associated risk profile daily by the TIRM



II 、 Development of the RIA Tool, Risk Monitor (2 of 7)


- For further risk-informed applications, only Core Damage Frequency (CDF) index in the TIRM is not sufficient
- A new risk engine, the INERISKEN, developed by INER was incorporated into the TIRM-2
- By introducing the new powerful risk model solver INERISKEN, the TIRM-2 is designed to have more capabilities of performing both CDF and LERF calculations and to run faster than TIRM does

II · Development of the RIA Tool, Risk Monitor (4 of 7)



Risk Profiles during Refuelling Outage in TIRM-2

II、Development of the RIA Tool, Risk Monitor (5 of 7)



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Nucleonics Week

Volume 45 / Number 25 / June 17, 2004

Asia's nuclear generators count on risk management to cut costs

Nuclear power generators in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are quietly pressing regulators to revise their assessment of risk, and are settling for better performance and lower production costs. That risk-informed regulatory regime is the one the lines being done in the U.S.

In all three Asian locations, regulatory consultants said they are not averse to flexible risk management guidelines.


the committee's secretary, Norman Gentner, said last month.

Present knowledge indicates that the excess mortality from non-cancer diseases after exposure to radiation is

non-cancer death rate

The second version of the Taiwan Integrated Risk Monitor (TIRM-2) was born out of the need, established six years ago, to assess the risk of a cable fire in non-qualified materials during outages at the Maanshan PWRs and Kuosheng BWRs. The need stemmed from a conclusion by NRC that calculations for both large early release frequency and core damage frequency were essential for assessing the risk. Taipower then invested about (U.S.)\$300,000 into the fire protection risk assessment project. According to INER officials, Taipower has calculated so far that using the fire risk assessment program will alone save about (U.S.)\$6-million annually for each of two BWRs at Chinshan.

II、Development of the RIA Tool, Risk Monitor (6 of 7)



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Inside NRC

Volume 26 / Number 16 / August 9, 2004

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

Risk-informed outage fire protection moving ahead for all Taipower LWRs

Acting on needs expressed beginning six years ago by Taiwan Power Co. (Taipower) for better fire safety during outages, a computer code to assess fire outage risk for the two Kuosheng BWRs and two Maanshan PWRs was established in 2002 by Taiwan's regulator, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) and its Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) in Lungtan. A second, more advanced code was finished last year and is now in use for determining the fire risk profile of all reactors, including the two Chinshan BWR-4 plant.

One Taiwanese expert said that the current outage fire risk management software and hardware puts Taipower, INER, and AEC "somewhat ahead of the world," which has "just begun" development for certain reactors.

In part on the basis of computer code development, this spring, Taipower officials said, AEC has awarded some contracts to develop fire risk analysis software for the two Chinshan reactors. The code development was financed by an investment by Taipower of some (U.S.)\$300,000. Use of the second version at the two Chinshan reactors so far, officials said, has saved the utility about \$6-million.

The code for fire risk analysis was set up for use with the Taiwan Integrated Risk Monitor (TIRM), which was developed by INER in parallel with development of risk-informed regulations. The second advanced version of the risk monitor is TIRM-2. It was ready in June 2003, Kao said.

The code development was financed by an investment by Taipower of some (U.S.)\$300,000. Use of the second version at the two Chinshan reactors so far, officials said, has saved the utility about \$6-million.

(Continued on page 11)

II、Development of the RIA Tool, Risk Monitor (7 of 7)

Table 4-6 Overview of Risk Monitor software packages

Name	Year first released	Owner of the software	Solution method(s) and algorithms	Integrated approach	Available for purchase	Countries where used
Risk Supervisor	Not known	Regulatory body, Hungary	Risk Spectrum ^[10] solution engine used to solve models.	No	Yes	Hungary
DynaRM	2002	KAERI	Requantification using KIP			Korea
RIMS	2003	KOPEC	Requantification using FO			Korea
TIRM-2	2003 ^[11]	TPC & INER	Requantification using INE			Taiwan

Notes for Table 4-1

- [1] 1988 refers to first use in Heysham 2 control room after commissioning.
- [2] 1988 refers to the original VAX installation. The 1996 release was a major update.
- [3] Denotes the release as an EPRI product. SAIC was performing the development.
- [4] Licence required for solution engines.
- [5] PSIMEX solution engine, which is distributed as part of the standard software package.
- [6] ORAM (shutdown risk) was released in 1992, SENTINEL (at power risk) was released in 1993.
- [7] PSALink is owned by Erin Research Inc. User requires licence to use.
- [8] Separate licence required for RSAT (RiskSpectrum).
- [9] Separate licence required for RSAT.
- [10] Separate licence required for RiskSpectrum.
- [11] TIRM-2 is a further development of TIRM, which was released in 2000.

RISK MONITORS

**A Report on the
State of the Art in their
Development and Use**

**Produced on behalf of
IAEA and OECD WGRisk**

Issue 7, April 2004

se.



III 、 Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE (1 of 8)

- PRA Model Based Risk Significance Evaluation
- A computer tool to evaluate risk significance of inspection findings under the request from TAEC
- Risk significance is determined by Δ CDF and indicated by four different color codes (G W Y R)
- Risk-informed and efficient process to evaluate inspection findings
- Provide bases of decision making for inspectors



III 、 Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE (2 of 8)

- Taiwan AEC decides to adopt a new approach, so called “**Green/Red Lights**” scheme, for nuclear safety oversight starting from January of year 2006
- The “Green/Red Lights”-scheme approach is inspired from the revised Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) of the USNRC
- Under this scheme, the **performance indicators** are provided by the utility and **inspection findings** of the resident inspectors provide the inputs to the regulatory action considerations



III · Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE (3 of 8)

Safety-Related System List

System Operating Status

Operating Status | Initiating Event | Component | Summary of Change | Exit

Front Line System

- RCIC
- HPCS
- ADS
- LPCS

RHR

- RHR System
- Train
 - RHR-A
 - RHR-B
 - RHR-C

SBLC

- SBLC System
- Train
 - SBLC-A
 - SBLC-B

Support System

- COND
- CSTXR
- SGTS
- FIRE WATER

ECW

- ECW System
- Train
 - ECW-A
 - ECW-B
 - ECW-C

ECIW

- EChW System
- Train
 - EChW-A
 - EChW-B

Power Supply

- 345KV
- 69KV
- BUS A5
- D/G I
- D/G II
- D/G III
- D/G 5

A3

- Bus A3
- MCC
 - C3A
 - C3B
 - C3C
 - C3D

A4

- Bus A4
- MCC
 - C4A
 - C4B
 - C4C
 - C4D

P&ID

Front Line System

- RCIC
- LPCS
- HPCS
- LPCI
- RHR S/D Cooling
- RHR S/P Cooling
- RHR CTMT Spray
- SBLC

Support System

- ECW
- EChW-A
- EChW-B
- Condensate
- CST Transfer
- SGTS
- FIRE WATER

Power Supply

- Bus & D/G I
- Bus & D/G II
- Bus & D/G III
- D/G 5

Status

System	Remark

System Operating Status

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

- RCIC System Unavailable **System Unavailable**
- RCIC Failure Rate Increase by **System Degraded**

Confirm Change&Quit | Not Selected&Quit

P&ID


System Unavailable
System Degraded



III - Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE (4 of 8)

Display of SSCs modeled in PRA

Component modeled in PRA shown in color



Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)



III 、 Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE (5 of 8)

Initiating Event Frequencies

Operating Status Initiating Event Component Summary of Change Exit

Initiating Event				
Description	Original	Modified	Times of Increase	
IE : LARGE LOCA	3.00E-05			
IE : BYPASS LOCA	1.70E-07			
IE : RPV RUPTURE	2.70E-07			
IE : INTERMEDIATE LOCA	4.00E-05			
IE : SMALL LOCA	3.83E-03			
IE : MAIN CONDENSER ISOLATION TRANSIENT	2.15E-01			
IE : MSIVS CLOSED TRANSIENT	3.06E-02			
IE : MAIN STEAM NOT ISOLATION TRANSIENT	1.35E+00			
IE : LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER	3.15E-02	3.15E-01	10	
IE : INADVERTENT OPEN OF ONE S/RV (IORV)	4.68E-02			
IE : LOSS-OF-FEEDWATER	6.10E-02			
IE : LOSS OF 480V MCC 1C4C	2.01E-04			
IE : LOSS OF COMPRESSED AIR	2.20E-04			
IE : LOSS OF DC BUS 1RDC	6.70E-04			
IE : LOSS OF DC BUS 1GDD	6.70E-04			
IE : VLOCA AT LPCI INJECTION LINE A	4.28E-08			
IE : VLOCA AT LPCI INJECTION LINE B	4.28E-08			
IE : VLOCA AT LPCI INJECTION LINE C	3.29E-06			
IE : VLOCA AT RHR S/D COOLING SUCTION	1.52E-07			
IE : VLOCA AT RHR HEAD SPRAY INJECTION	3.29E-06			
IE : VLOCA AT RHR S/D COOLING INJECTION LINE A (FW A)	7.66E-06			
IE : VLOCA AT RHR S/D COOLING INJECTION LINE B (FW B)	7.66E-06			
IE : VLOCA AT LPCS INJECTION	3.29E-06			
IE : VLOCA INDUCED LARGE LOCA OUTSIDE CTMT	9.23E-09			
IE : VLOCA INDUCED LARGE LOCA INSIDE CTMT	9.44E-10			

Previous Cases

Quote Cases Modified Cases Delete Cases

Quote Cases

Title :

Create Name : Administrator

Create Time : 2005/9/21 08:55:59

Description :

Clear All Change Refresh Frequencies Save New Case

List of changes in Initiating Event frequencies as affected by the findings



III 、 Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE (7 of 8) Significance Determination Results

Phase 2 Result

[Exit]

Results

CDF (Base Case) : 1.36E-05

CDF (Modified) : 3.50E-04

Difference : 3.36E-04

CDF

ΔCDF

Exposure Time : 7 (Days) [Calculate]

ΔCDF : 6.44E-06 [White]

Exposure Time

Risk Information

Summary All Change

Summary List

Minimum Cut Sets

MCS

Importance Analysis

F-V [RAW] [RRW]

Other Risk Index

New Case Save as New Case Print Result

Risk Significance Color Codes

- Red
- Yellow
- White
- Green

System Operating Status

System	Remark	Times of Increase
RCIC	RCIC System Unavailable	

Initiating Event Frequencies

Description	Original	Modified	Times of Increase
IE : LOSS OF OFFSITE POW	3.15E-02	3.15E-01	10

Component

Description	Original	Modified	Times of Increase
CHECK VALVE E51-F011 FA	2.92E-04	2.92E-03	10
CHECK VALVE E51-F030 FA	2.92E-04	2.92E-03	10
CHECK VALVE E51-F040 FA	2.92E-04	2.92E-03	10
BREAKER VALVE E51-F079	2.92E-04	2.92E-03	10
BREAKER VALVE E51-F081	2.92E-04	2.92E-03	10
CHECK VALVE E51-F040 FA	2.92E-04	2.92E-03	10
CHECK VALVE E51-F065 FA	2.92E-04	2.92E-03	10



III 、 Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE (8 of 8)

- Three dedicated versions (BWR-4, BWR-6, PWR) of PRiSE2.0 have been released to inspectors for daily use since February of 2006
- Current version includes internal events for power operation with the feature for containment integrity assessment (LERF)
- It is expected that the shutdown feature of the PRiSE will be released in 2009 and external events feature will be available in 2010

III 、 Comments on the PRiSE

Comments proposed by Professor George Apostolakis (MIT Professor, Former ACRS Chairman) toward the presentation of PRiSE at the 26th Annual Meeting of the Chung-Hwa Nuclear Society, Taiwan, December 1, 2004:

This computer tool replaces the table that the USNRC has developed for performing Phase 1 and 2 (and Part of Phase 3) of the SDP. I have expressed the view in the past that these tables are awkward, so I was very pleased to see that INER is developing PRiSE. What facilitated the development of PRiSE was the use of the INERISKEN engine, which solves the PRA model in less than a minute.

III、Development of the RIR/SDP Tool, PRiSE 2.0 Significance Determination Results with LERF

Phase 2 結果分析【核一廠】

【主選單】

結果

△CDF

CDF (原始值): 3.93E-06
 CDF (更新值): 1.92E-05
 CDF 增量: 1.53E-05

持續時間 (天): 10
 【計算】
 △CDF: 4.19E-07
 綠色

△LERF

LERF (原始值): 1.64E-06
 LERF (更新值): 2.43E-06
 LERF 增量: 7.90E-07

△LERF: 2.16E-08
 綠色

風險顯著性: 綠色

其他風險資訊


變更狀態列表
 【變更狀態】

CDF
 【最小失效組合】 [F-V] [RAW] [RRW]

LERF
 【最小失效組合】

【重新分析】 【儲存】 【列印】

CDF & LERF



系統狀態變更

系統名稱	系統失效狀態	增加倍數
RCIC	RCIC 系統不可用	

肇始事件發生頻率變更

肇始事件	原始頻率	更新後頻率	增加倍數

元件失效機率變更

元件名稱及失效模式	原始失效機率	修改後失效機率	增加倍數



IV · Development of Risk-Informed Fire Analysis and ISI (1 of 3)

- Due to the unavailability of qualified fire wrap material for BWR-4 cable trays, plant people found that it was very difficult to meet the current requirements of Appendix R
- Use of the advanced PRA technology and associated code allows the TAEC/TPC staff to perform risk-informed fire analysis, post-fire safety shutdown function analysis, and assessment of cable tray fire wrap, to serve as the technical basis for Appendix R exemption requests and they have been approved by TAEC for the BWR-4 in December of 2005, and for the BWR-6 and the PWR in October of 2006

IV 、 Development of Risk-Informed Fire Analysis and ISI (2 of 3)

Layout of Cables in Fire Area(s)

Result of Quantitative Analysis

Case	Cable Tray Wrapped	CDF	Delta	LERF	Delta
APP. R (base)	Train A	2.48E-07		2.57E-08	
Current State	No wrapping	3.41E-06	3.16E-06	3.06E-07	2.80E-07
RIFA Option 1	Cable tray and conduit CV01	7.29E-07	4.81E-07	5.75E-08	3.18E-08
RIFA Option 2	No wrapping, but with other improvements for cable tray and conduit CV01: a. Fast-response fire detection and suppression (< 1 min.) b. Fire watching camera and alarm for monitoring hot spots of degraded cables	8.37E-07	5.88E-07	6.74E-08	4.17E-08

Buttons: Qualitative Analysis, Layout for COMPRN, Exit

Sub-Scenario	Pilot Fire	Target	Fire Initiating Frequency	FG, i	FS, i	FNS, i
4I-L3	Train A Cable Tray CW01 669 pound	Train B Cable Tray DZ01	1.35E-05	1.00E+00	3.00E-02	1.00E-02
4I-L4	Train B Cable Tray DZ01 706 pound	Train A Cable Tray CW01	1.43E-05	1.00E+00	7.50E-02	1.00E-02
4I-L5	Train B Cable Trays 4228 pound	None				
4I-L5-1	Train B Cable Tray DX01 841pound	None	1.70E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L5-2	Train B Cable Tray DX02 841pound	None	1.70E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L5-3	Train B Cable Tray DX03 809 pound	None	1.64E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L5-4	Train B Cable Tray DY01 235 pound	None	4.74E-06	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L5-5	Train B Cable Tray DZ01 706 pound	None	1.43E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L5-6	Train B Cable Tray DZ02 708 pound	None	1.43E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L5-7	Train B Cable Tray FC01 44 pound	None	8.82E-07	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L5-8	Train B Cable Tray FD01 44 pound	None	4.41E-07	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L6	Train A Cable Trays 4380 pound	None				
4I-L6-1	Train A Cable Tray CT01 746 pound	None	1.51E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L6-2	Train A Cable Tray CT02 746 pound	None	1.51E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L6-3	Train A Cable Tray CU01 685 pound	None	1.39E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00
4I-L6-4	Train A Cable Tray CU02 687 pound	None	1.39E-05	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+00

Buttons: Detailed, Photos, Exit

Windows: 開始, 國外..., 收件..., 2.3-..., Micro..., 黃乙..., Progr..., Main ..., rifadis..., Layout..., 04:44 PM


Display of Wrap Options from RIFA-2



IV 、 Development of Risk-Informed Fire Analysis and ISI (3 of 3)

- INER has also established the methodology for the evaluation and development of a pilot, plant-specific RI-ISI program for a BWR-6 plant in Taiwan
- The number of inspection elements selected in the RI-ISI evaluation has been decreased to only 50, representing a reduction of up to 56% in comparison with 113 inspections in the current ASME inspection program and the plant staff will have more time to focus on those RI safety-related elements
- Extend containment ILRT interval from 3 times per 10 years to once per 10 years


IV、On-Line Maintenance Case Studies



V · QRA Application on LNG (1 of 5)


- The INER applies the PRA technology and provides the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) technical service to evaluate the potential risk and quantitative safety for the three first-phase Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tank systems of the LNG plant in Taiwan
- The results of this assessment has be used as the basis for applying an exemption from Taiwan's regulatory body's requirements of periodic internal inspection for LNG tanks
- To provide the true picture of the risks posed by the LNG facilities, the QRA that includes all plausible release scenarios will be conducted in two stages, the first stage includes the auxiliary attachment and piping of LNG tank systems, and the second stage includes all equipments of the LNG plant
- Another project to perform the external events QRA on tanks system of the LNG Plant has been granted in September 2008

V • QRA Application on LNG (2 of 5)



V • QRA Application on LNG (3 of 5)

Analysis process for the QRA of an LNG Storage Tank system



V • QRA Application on LNG (4 of 5)

Bird's Eye View of LNG Plant



V • QRA Application on LNG (5 of 5)

In-ground Storage Tank of LNG

Slide 9(B)

SIDE WALL

SIDE
MEMBRANE


CORNER
ANGLE

SIDE
INSULATION

BOTTOM
INSULATION

BOTTOM SLAB


BOTTOM
MEMBRANE



V • Event Tree of Unloading Piping

Unloading Piping has a 10mm Hole Size leak at Circulation phase	Not Immediate Ignition	Emergency Pump Shutdown of ESD	Emergency Process Isolation of ESD	Escalation Prevention	Delayed ignition /explosion	SEQ #	SEQUENCE DESCRIPTOR	PDS #	FREQUENCY	
US ₁	NII	EPS	EPISO	EP	IGNL					
SL-T101-UL 3.35E-02	Not Ignit. Prob. 0.9858	GESD145-1 1.21E-03	GESD101-1 8.34E-04		No ignition	1	US ₁	OK	3.30E-02	
					Flash Fire 7.42E-03 VCE 8.40E-03	2	US ₁ IGNLF	FF	2.45E-04	
					No ignition	3	US ₁ IGNLV	VCE	2.77E-04	
					No ignition	4	US ₁ EPISO	OK	2.75E-05	
					Flash Fire 7.42E-03 VCE 8.40E-03	5	US ₁ EPISOIGNLF	FF	2.04E-07	
					No ignition	6	US ₁ EPISOIGNLV	VCE	2.31E-07	
					No ignition	7	US ₁ EPS	OK	4.00E-05	
					Flash Fire 7.42E-03 VCE 8.40E-03	8	US ₁ EPSIGNLF	FF	2.96E-07	
					No ignition	9	US ₁ EPSIGNLV	VCE	3.36E-07	
					No ignition	10	US ₁ EPSEPIISO	OK	3.33E-08	
	Ignit. Prob. 1.42E-02	GESD145-2 1.36E-03	GESD101-2 8.26E-04	FWS102 6.49E-03		Flash Fire 7.42E-03 VCE 8.40E-03	11	US ₁ EPSEPIISOIGNLF	FF	2.47E-10
						Jet or Pool Fire	12	US ₁ EPSEPIISOIGNLV	VCE	2.80E-10
						Jet or Pool Fire	13	US ₁ NII	JPF	4.76E-04
						Jet or Pool Fire	14	US ₁ NIIEP	JPF	3.09E-06
						Jet or Pool Fire	15	US ₁ NIIEPISO	JPF	3.93E-07
						Jet or Pool Fire	16	US ₁ NIIEPISOEP	JPF	2.55E-09
						Jet or Pool Fire	17	US ₁ NIIEPS	JPF	6.47E-07
						Jet or Pool Fire	18	US ₁ NIIEPSEP	JPF	4.20E-09
						Jet or Pool Fire	19	US ₁ NIIEPSEPIISO	JPF	5.34E-10
						Jet or Pool Fire	20	US ₁ NIIEPSEPIISOEP	JPF	3.47E-12

V、Fault Tree of Fire Water System




Individual risk caused by LNG tank systems



Societal Risk F-N curve due to LNG tank systems

(ALARP : As Low As Reasonably Practical)

Accumulated Frequency [1/year]





VI、Conclusions (1 of 3)

- Since June of 2005, the NPPs of Taiwan are planning to implement a few of performance enhancement programs regarding the issues of power updates, life extension, and outage shortening by increasing fuel burn up
- INER is aware of the potential safety margin reductions and the PRA methodology will be adopted to estimate the synergistic safety impacts to perform these three issues at the same time



VI、Conclusions (2 of 3)

- A powerful risk monitor, TIRM-2, has replaced TIRM to provide the basis of risk-informed applications in Taiwan
- With the capability of performing CDF and LERF calculations, the TIRM-2 becomes a very helpful tool in monitoring the risk of different plant states and provides further information directly for risk-informed applications
- The PRiSE has replaced the tables that the USNRC has developed for performing Phases 1 and 2 (and part of Phase 3) of the SDP

VI 、 Conclusions (3 of 3)

- The view and usage of these tables are complicated and time-consuming; so that the PRiSE has provided an alternative tool for Taiwan's resident inspectors to easily solve the PRA model in less than a minute
- With these credible assessment tools and other subsequent proposed cases of risk-informed applications, a new era of risk-informed regulations and applications has been initiated in Taiwan's nuclear society
- To broaden PRA applications in petrochemical industry, energy security, anti-terrorism of infrastructures, risk assessment of tunnel fire, risk management and insurance of natural catastrophe

Thank You for the Attention!!