

**Session C-11: Level 2 PSA of Nuclear Power Plants I**

**Paper #170**

**The Development of Simplified LERF  
Estimation Model of ABWR**

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# Outline

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- **Introduction**
- **Containment Event Tree**
- **Thermal-Hydraulic Calculation**
- **LERF Event Tree**
- **Result and Conclusion**



# Introduction

- **NUREG/CR-6595**
  - Simplified approach for LERF estimation from Level-1 PSA results
  - Containment event tree for each type of containment
  - Probability of containment failure of specific plant configuration
- **Following the approach of NUREG/CR-6595 to identify large early release sequences of ABWR containment**
  - Consider unique design and plant operating procedure of ABWR
  - Develop containment event tree of ABWR
  - Develop LERF event trees for ABWR
  - Identify large early release sequences from LERF event trees
  - Estimate LERF from large early release sequences




# Containment Event Tree

- **Issues that may be important when identifying large early release sequences of ABWR**
  - ATWS
  - Late containment failure
  - Containment integrity
  - RCS depressurization
  - Core damage arrested before vessel breach
  - Water on drywell floor
  - Venting after vessel breach
  - Containment failure at vessel breach



# Containment Event Tree





# Containment Failure Rate

- Key design parameters of different containment

Design Parameter	Mark I	Mark II	Mark III	ABWR
Pressure Suppression	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Barriers	2	2	3	2
Volume (million ft <sup>3</sup> )	0.4	0.5	1.6	0.5
Heat Capacity (billion BTU)	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.3
Design Pressure (Psig)	62	45	15	45
LOCA Pressure (Psig)	44	42	9	39

- ABWR containment design is very close to that of Mark II containment
- Containment failure probability used for Mark II containment is recommended





# Thermal-Hydraulic Calculation

- **MAAP run of large break LOCA event**
  - Double-ended feedwater line break
  - Disable all coolant injection, containment spray and passive flooder
  - Core uncovered at 115 seconds after LOCA
  - Reactor vessel failed at 4.6 hours after LOCA
  - Containment failed at 17.8 hours after LOCA
- **ABWR containment design can effectively prevent large early release without any containment spray if the containment was not bypassed**
- **Containment spray is not considered in ABWR containment event tree**



# Thermal-Hydraulic Calculation

- The estimation of time to vessel failed
  - Time available for operator to recover coolant injection
  - 9 typical plant status were selected to perform MAAP run

Initiating Event	System Status	Time to vessel failed
Large LOCA	-	280 Min
Intermediate LOCA	-	293 Min
<b>Small LOCA</b>	<b>With RCIC</b>	<b>13 Hr</b>
Small LOCA	Without RCIC	314 Min
<b>MSIV Closure</b>	<b>All SRV closed, with RCIC</b>	<b>9.6 Hr</b>
MSIV Closure	All SRV close, without RCIC	212 Min
<b>MSIV Closure</b>	<b>One SRV stuck open, with RCIC</b>	<b>10.2 Hr</b>
MSIV Closure	One SRV stuck open, without RCIC	280 Min
MSIV Closure	2 or more SRVs stuck open	270 Min





# LERF Event Tree

- **Develop LERF event tree for each initiating event of Level-1 PSA**
- **Take credit for the recovery of ECCS and the alternate cooling methods**
- **Major concerns while developing LERF event tree**
  - Sequences with control rods fail to insert into the core
  - Possible alternate core cooling methods
  - Effects of RCIC operation after initiating event
- **Identify large early release sequences in LERF event tree**
- **Quantify large early release sequences**
- **LERF will be the frequency summation of all large early release sequences in all LERF event trees**







# Results and Conclusions

- **LERF is significant lower than traditional BWR**
- **The installation of passive flooder has significant effect to prevent large early release**
- **Three independent ECCS divisions design of ABWR can significant improve the reliability of core cooling**
- **Alternate core cooling methods has significant effect in preventing large early release**
  - Fire water pump with its own diesel generator
  - Motor-driven feedwater pump
  - Transferring water from condensate storage tank